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the crime when committed. Alibi evidence differs from an
affirmative defense such as insanity by attempting to cast
doubt on the defendant's presence rather than to escape
criminal liability. 19 A defendant is presumed to have been
sane, but he cannot be presumed to have been present without denying him his presumption of innocence. While some
courts have held that the burden of proof is upon the demeant the
fendant with respect to alibi,2 0 this has usually
1
burden of introducing evidence in its support.2
North Dakota is among the most liberal jurisdictions on
the matter of alibi." It has no disclosure 2 statute, and has
had no case law on the subject since 1924. 3
RICHARD BOARDMAN

DAMAGES-INJURIES

TO

THE

PERSON-IMPAIRMENT

OF

EARNING CAPACITY-COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE-Plaintiffs,
members of the U. S. Air Force, were involved in an
automobile accident and brought suit to recover damages
for personal injuries. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a unanimous decision, held that plaintiffs were entitled to recover for loss of earning capacity even though
they continued to receive their pay. from the government
during the period of disability. Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H.
227, 183 A.2d 729 (1962).
The measure of damages in personal injury cases may
be stated generally as that amount which will compensate
for all the dletriment proximately caused by the wrongful act
or breach of duty.' Specifically, in actions of tort for personal injuries, damages are recoverable for loss of capacity
19.

20 Am. Jur., Evidence

§ 153

(1939).

20. People v. Weiss, 367 Ill. 580, 12 N.E.2d 652 (1937); Commonwealth
v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870).
21. State v. Brauneis, 84 Conn. 222, 79 Atl. 70 (1911); State v. Thornton,
10 S.D. 349, 73 N.W. 196 (1897).
22. A recent example of the liberality on alibi in North Dakota courts
is found in State v. MacDonald (N.D. Dist. 1963) in which Redetzke J.
instructed, "It is sufficient to justify an acquittal if the evidence on that
point raises a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the accused at the
time and place of the commission of the crime."
23. See State v. Gates, 51 N.D. 695, 200 N.W. 778 (1924).
1.

See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-20

(1961).
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to earn during the period of disability. 2 Conflict has arisen,
however, where the injured party has suffered no actual expense or loss because of contributions or indemnification from
q collateral source. The rule of law adopted in many jurishas come to be known as the "collatdictions in such cases
'3
eral source rule.

The "collateral source rule" provides that damages may
not be mitigated on account of payments received by the
plaintiff from sources other than the defendant4 and has
been applied in such situations as donations, 5 gratuitous
medical attention, 6 indemnification by insurance 7 and
where monies were received from a governmental agency
during the period of disability.8
In those jurisdictions that do not follow the "collateral
source rule" it has been criticized as being anomalous and
illogical. Consequently the measure of damages in those.
jurisdictions is that amount actually spent by the plaintiff
in taking care of his injuries. 9 However, in those jurisdictions following the "collateral source rule" it is felt that
one whose acts have caused injury to another should not
reap the benefit of the fact that the injured party's damages are in some way mitigated from a collateral source.'"
In North Dakota the case of Ostmo v. Tennyson applied
the "collateral source rule" principle where a defendant was
not allowed to take advantage of the fact that a truck, damaged through his negligence, was repaired at no cost to the
plaintiff."
Dowling v. L. H. Shattuck, Inc., 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529, 536 (1941);
2.
Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co., 73 N.D. 134, 12 N.W.2d 526, 529 (1944) "The
general rule is that one who is injured in his person through the fault
of another may recover for loss sustained through being deprived of his
earning bower."
see
730 (1962);
729,
3.
Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d

Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule. 41 B.U.L. Rev. 348 (1961).
4. Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d 729, 730 (1962).
5. See McLaughlin v. City of Corry, 77 Pa. 109 (1875).
6. See Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 327.
142 N.W. 706, 708 (1913). Contra, Evans
pany. 255 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 1958).

v.

Pennsylvania

Railroad

Com-

7. See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.V. 374, 376 (1927).
8. See Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767.
770 (1921) Sums paid to defendant under Federal Vocational Rehabilitation
Act not deducted from damages.
9. See Kane v. Reed, 48 Del. 266, 101 A.2d 800, 802 (1954).
10. See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374. 376 (1927).
11. 70 N.D. 558, 296 N.W. 541, 545 (1941); see Gillis v. Farmers Union
Oil Co. of Rhame, 186 F. Supp. 331 (D.N.D. 1960). Recovery was allowed
for medical services rendered to the plantiff, a member of the U.S. Army.
at no cost to the plaintiff.
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In general the "collateral source rule" has found favor
with many courts and has been liberally applied in a variety
of situations. A reason for this favor, it is submitted, is
the basic proposition that the duty of the wrongdoer is to
answer for the damages wrought by his wrongful act, and
that such damages are measured by the whole loss so caused.12
For these reasons, and in light of the fact that Ostmo
v. Tennyson seems to have brought the spirit of the "collateral source rule" to North Dakota, it is felt that this principle should not be overlooked in computing damages and
should be applied in North Dakota litigation.
MAURICE

INSURANCE-SUICIDE-INSURER

HAS

TO

PROVE

E. COOK

SUICIDE

life insurance
policy provided that in the event that death was caused by
suicide the policy would be void. The insured's body was
found amid circumstances which showed death could have
been a suicide and the insurance company defended on that
ground. The trial judge's instruction to the jury, consistent
with a well established rule in Iowa,' was, in effect, that
the insurer had to produce evidence sufficient to exclude
every other reasonably probable theory as to the cause of
death. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa, abrogating
the above mentioned rule, held, three justices dissenting and
one justice dissenting in part, that evidence showing suicide
was more probable than any other theory was sufficient.
Bill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 119 N.W. 2d 768 (Iowa
1963).
MORE PROBABLE THAN ANY OTHER THEORY-A

The law of England imposed a severe penalty for the
taking of one's own life. 2 The resulting hardship on the
12. Francis
822 (1923).

v. Atcheson, T. & S. F.

Ry.. 113 Tex. 202,

253 S.W.

819.

1. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. National Life Ass'n, 208 Iowa 246, 225 N.W.
242 (1929); Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N.W. 808
(1921); Mickalek v. Modern Bhd. of America, 179 Iowa 33, 161 N.W. 125
(1917); Wood v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, 166 Iowa 391.
147 N.W. 888; Stephenson v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 108 Iowa 637, 79 N.W. 459
(1899).
2. Blackstone relates that the law of England required the forfeiture
of all of the deceased's goods and chattels to the Crown and required an
ignominious burial on the public highway with a stake driven through
the body. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 190 (Lewis' ed. 1897).

